I last wrote on Libertarian candidate’s Gary Johnson’s Presidential campaign in 2016, providing the analysis behind a longtail scenario I had imagined in which, contingent on hitting specific triggers, there was a plausible if unlikely prospect that he could be the first third party candidate in decades to gain electoral votes, an outcome which could potentially deprive both of the major party candidates of the necessary 270 votes to avoid Congressional purview in the electoral decision.
Despite mutual dislike of the primary two candidates at historic proportions, once Johnson’s first trigger of reaching 15% in the requisite pre-debate polls (or alternatively successfully petitioning the Debate committee to waive the requirement) was missed, his election became essentially impossible. William Weld, Johnson’s running mate, even publicly acknowledged this while the campaign was ongoing, admitting in an October interview that the “real world” goal was to win merely 5% of the national vote, a threshold that would deliver federal matching funds and ballot access for the party in future elections. He also provoked the ire of some Libertarians and Republicans by publicly expressing a preference for Clinton over Trump. 1 In the end, the ticket didn’t come close to the 5% threshold.
Explaining The (unexpected) Victor: Donald Trump
Innumerable pundits, professional and otherwise, strained to attribute the ascent of Donald Trump in 2016 to some factor or another. Many explanations during his unexpected run of success in the Republican primaries revolved around what they identified as a budding distrust among Republican voters of the “establishment”–Trump, of course, the anti-establishment candidate not only in terms of policy pronouncements running counter to traditional GOP positions on issues like free trade, but also in personal style, indignantly eschewing the advice of all of those same pundits who bristled at his frequent unscripted, un-Presidential faux pas to tighten control over his public speech, instead doubling down by holding increasingly raucous campaign rallies and hiring a campaign manager who backed a “Let Trump be Trump” strategy.
While certainly a sui generis Presidential campaign–“unorthodox” as anything other than a comically understated descriptor constitutes an injustice to its novelty and absurdity– two constants of American political history can explain it to those still nonplussed at the improbability of Donald Trump’s election.
First, The Outsider Effect
Washington is perpetually unpopular, which confers privileged status to those who have a claim at being an outsider. In particular, Americans historically prefer outsiders with executive experience–usually Governors or Generals–as these candidates are able to draw an easy contrast with members of Congress as being action-oriented, in contradistinction to the legislators who are relegated by the rules of a deliberative body into perceived torpor. Unlike in Great Britain, where Prime Ministers typically have long careers in Parliament before their election*, American Presidents rarely come from Congress, and if they do, it’s usually after an intervening period as Vice President. For a Presidential candidate, a long legislative history is actually a liability, as being forced to take positions on hundreds or thousands of pieces of legislation allows opponents extensive opportunities to cherry-pick the most unpalatable votes and harp on them during the campaign. It is almost impossible to escape a legislative career without many votes that will become problematic in the future, in part because of the arcane procedures which sometimes produce bills with a host of amendments unrelated to or incongruent with the primary subject of the bill, creating difficult decisions for Members of Congress, and in part because the interests of one’s constituents do not always line up with Presidential primary or general election voters.
Only three Presidents since the turn of the 20th century have come directly from Congress, and all three had a short enough stay as to both retain credibility as an outsider and avoid a lengthy and problematic legislative record. Senators Harding, Kennedy and Obama all became President during their first Senate term. George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Richard Nixon, Franklin Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson all became President during or directly after their Governorships, Eisenhower after WW2 service and a University Presidency; Herbert Hoover and William Howard Taft from Cabinet positions; and all of the remaining from the Vice Presidency.
The outsider phenomenon in American politics can be traced back at least to Andrew Jackson’s election in 1828. The first six Presidents had been aristocrats all with a direct tie to the founders of the country, whereas Jackson, was the beneficiary of egalitarian reforms in the 1810’s and ’20s that expanded the franchise from only only property-owning white men to all white men, giving the common man new influence in American democracy. As the franchise has continued to expand, and since parties began holding primaries instead of choosing candidates at their national conventions, the outsider effect has become more pronounced over time.
Donald Trump was an outsider in the best possible way–not just to Washington, like some of the Governors in the race– but to politics in general, and his behavior and continual disrespect for existing political norms repeatedly reinforced it in the minds of voters.
Second, The Obama Theory of Trump
In all of the prattle called political commentary this election cycle, one observation stood out to me for its insight into Donald Trump’s success with voters. It came from former Obama Chief Campaign strategist, David Axelrod. “Open-seat presidential elections are shaped by perceptions of the style and personality of the outgoing incumbent. Voters rarely seek the replica of what they have. They almost always seek the remedy, the candidate who has the personal qualities the public finds lacking in the departing executive.” Axelrod furnishes Obama’s perceptions of Obama as hesitant, weak and given to appeasement in foreign affairs (though it should be noted Axelrod considers these misunderstandings of Obama’s virtues).
His own style an answer to the George W. Bush Presidency, Obama’s gentler touch on foreign affairs–legendary journalist Bob Woodward recounted a conversation with a prominent foreign leader who said of Obama, referencing America’s enemies: “No one’s afraid of him”– pushed the larger share of voters not to Marco Rubio, who advocated for a robust role (“There is only one nation on earth capable of rallying and bringing together the free people on this planet to stand up to the spread of totalitarianism”), but to candidate Trump, whose blustery pronouncements drew a caricature of the qualities the public found lacking in the prior executive. Among them were his outrageous call in a GOP primary debate for the US military to execute not only terrorists, but their family members as well. He in rough, bull-in-a-china-shop style, exemplified to many the toughness Obama’s careful manner was missing.
Notes and Further Reading
*Prime Ministers in Great Britain are elected similarly to how we elect a Speaker of the House of Representatives. The legislator needs to win only his own district, and is then selected by members of his party in the legislature.
http://theweek.com/articles/659098/how-bill-weld-betrayed-libertarians
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